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The United States has been at war in Afghanistan for twenty years. For eighteen of these 
years, it has spent precious time, money, and resources to modernize the Afghan Air Force 
(AAF). In my thesis, I conduct a cost-benefit analysis of this strategy to determine whether the 
net benefits and the overall outcome of the program justify the level of U.S. investment. I 
compare U.S. efforts with the AAF to those with the Iraqi Air Force while exploring the idea of 
path dependency. My analysis reveals that U.S. efforts to modernize the AAF have been a 
failure. The United States has expended considerable costs but has not achieved its goal. The 
AAF has made some progress, but it still is unable to function as a fully, self-sustaining air force 
capable of performing its mission for the Afghan military. My recommendation is that the United 
States acknowledge the path dependency regarding the AAF and end their support. 
Introduction and Thesis Statement 
On March 2, 1933, the renowned British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, said that 
"Not to have an adequate air force in the present state of the world is to compromise the 
foundations of national freedom and independence" (Gilbert, 1991). Although these comments 
were made almost ninety years ago, they still ring true today and are echoed by many modern 
nations. The importance of air power in war has increased over time as technologies develop and 
new capabilities are discovered. First used in 1911 by Italy, aviation in combat has become a 
crucial component of modern warfare (MacIsaac, 2016). Since World War II, the United States 
has assembled and maintained the largest air force in the world, with a staggering total of 5,369 
aircraft in operation (Deptula et al., 2019). The U.S. Air Force (USAF) became a separate branch 
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of the military in 1947 and has participated in military operations in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and 
now Afghanistan. In addition, the United States has assisted other countries in building their air 
forces. In this paper, I examine the case of U.S. support for the Afghan Air Force (AAF). 
For the last twenty years, the United States has been at war in Afghanistan and embroiled 
in conflicts throughout the Middle East and South Asia. The longevity of these wars 
demonstrates the difficulty in resolving security challenges throughout the world. U.S. policy has 
been to offer military assistance and other forms of support to combat these challenges. 
However, there have been no easy solutions. In Afghanistan, the American goal to train and 
build security forces that would enable Afghanistan to secure itself when the United States left 
has been of limited success. 
According to the DOD Casualty Status report, 2,314 American service members and 
civilian contractors have been killed since the start of the war (U.S. Dept of Defense, 2021). 
Although this number and the duration of the war have received a lot of attention in the 
American press, the efforts to rebuild the AAF have not. The AAF has been a vastly 
understudied topic compared to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police forces. U.S. 
investment in the AAF is important not only because of the crucial role the AAF plays in the 
fight against the Taliban but also because the mission's success or failure could have serious 
consequences for how the United States approaches future attempts to rebuild or modernize 
partner nation air forces.  
My thesis explores U.S. policy in Afghanistan in relation to efforts to build an 
independent air force. I will use cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as my primary tool to examine the 
overall U.S. strategy in modernizing the AAF. To do so, I rely upon news articles, government 
reports, and personal interviews to evaluate the pertinent costs and benefits of U.S. policy while 
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also comparing U.S. practices in Afghanistan to those in Iraq. Finally, I will propose possible 
alternatives strategies and recommend the best course of action. 
History of the Afghan Air Force 
Before U.S. Intervention 
Almost every nation in the modern world has an air force. Airpower is used for a variety 
of mission sets such as moving troops and supplies, gathering intelligence, and destroying enemy 
targets. Airpower has proven highly capable in multiple conflicts and continues to evolve as 
technology progresses. Although some air forces have been around much longer than others, 
they all play an integral part in their respective country's national security strategy. 
Afghanistan can trace its air force back to the early 20th century. Initially formed in 
1924, the Royal Afghan Air Force mainly consisted of the Soviet-built Polikarpov R-1s. The first 
aircraft produced by the Soviet Union, this aircraft served in a variety of roles such as ground 
attack, light bomber, reconnaissance, and training (Rickard, 2011). Although these aircraft saw 
limited use, it became clear that aviation was crucial in a region with few roads, railways, or 
traversable waterways (Marion, 2018, pp. 28).  
In 1928, the country fell into civil war. Airpower was rarely used in the early years of 
domestic conflict due to the harsh terrain and difficulty of operations. Despite their limited use, 
many of these aircraft were destroyed in the fighting. In 1937, Afghanistan rebuilt the Royal 
Afghan Air Force, this time with substantial British support. This iteration used the British 
Hawker Hind and the Italian Imam Ro.37 aircraft. In 1973, the government dropped "Royal" and 
officially changed the name to the Afghan Air Force (AAF). During this period, under King 
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Zahir Shah's rule, the AAF received additional Soviet airframes, including state-of-the-art 
Soviet-built MiG-15s and Il-28 bombers.  
However, the AAF would not reach the height of its power until the 1979 Soviet invasion 
to prop up the embattled Afghan communist government against a powerful anti-communist 
insurgency. At one point, the AAF had up to 400 aircraft and 7,000 active personnel (some of 
whom were advisors from other nations such as Cuba and the Czech Republic) at their disposal 
and were briefly one of the biggest air forces in Asia. Yet, it should not be ignored how much 
control and influence the Soviets had over the AAF. Soviet officers often would direct Afghan 
aircrews and not disclose the nature of the mission until the last second. Additionally, Soviet 
technicians maintained most of the aircraft (Marion, 2018, pp. 25). This level of outside support 
was crucial, and ultimately, unsustainable. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, and its eventual 
dissolution, the AAF lost its leading supplier of parts and maintenance personnel, a huge blow to 
the AAF's ability to maintain viability. 
 With the Soviet departure, the remaining factions in Afghanistan fought amongst each 
other, and the country returned to civil war. After the British withdrew their support in the mid-
1900s, the AAF (still had "Royal" in the name) weakened. This period of declining strength was 
mirrored when the Soviets left the country. During this time, the warring factions scavenged 
most AAF assets. By the time the Taliban took over, many of the aircraft were useless, lacking 
spare parts and people who knew how to maintain them. Without the support of an outside nation 
(in this instance, the Soviet Union) providing material and technical support, the once-powerful 
AAF fell apart.  
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The U.S. Gets Involved 
 In 2001, after the devastating attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the 
United States invaded Afghanistan to drive out the Taliban and deny Al-Qaeda a haven. In the 
ensuing conflict, American airstrikes destroyed what was left of the feeble AAF. However, in 
2005, the U.S. and Coalition forces set in motion a plan to re-establish Afghan air power. The 
thinking was that the new nation must have a modern air force not only to fight insurgents and 
terrorists but also to support and augment the newly established Afghan National Army and 
Afghan National Police. This would be an international effort, with multiple nations helping to 
train and equip new personnel. In 2008, Afghan President Hamid Karzai opened the new AAF 
headquarters located at Kabul International Airport. With twenty-six refurbished aircraft donated 
by the United States and the Czech Republic, the AAF was reborn (Morrison, 2018). 
Since 2008, the United States has spent approximately $8 billion to train and equip the 
AAF. On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban agreed to a peace deal in Doha. 
With the potential end of America's twenty-year involvement in Afghanistan, will the AAF be 
able to stand on its own? (Qazi, 2020). On January 10, 2019, the New York Times published a 
scathing article called "The U.S. Spent $8 Billion on Afghanistan's Air Force. It's Still 
Struggling". In this article, reporter David Zucchino examines in detail the frustrating process of 
building up the AAF, with "no end in sight," and the possibility that the Afghan government 
"will rely on American maintenance and other support for years." The Coalition helping the 
AAF, primarily the U.S., is trying to get them to a state of self-sufficiency to fight insurgents on 
their own. This has proven rather difficult for a multitude of reasons (Zucchino, 2019). 
7 
Current State of the AAF 
The United States sees the AAF as a fundamental component to the war effort, with the 
goal of the AAF being able to provide their own security. However, this has not always been the 
case. In a 2017 report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
(SIGAR) titled Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from 
the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, vital capabilities such as aviation were "not included in U.S., 
Afghan, and NATO force design plans." (SIGAR, 2017). It was not until 2005 when the U.S. and 
Coalition forces decided to rebuild the Afghan air component. Initially projected to have full 
operational capability by September 2009, (Marion, 2018, pp. 47), the AAF's inability to carry 
out their mission with any meaningful impact led Army veteran and journalist Bill Roggio to 
comment, "The Taliban doesn't have an air force… They do quite well without it" (Zucchino, 
2019). Right now, the AAF has 271 aircraft in operation (Afghan Air Force, 2021). Even with 
numerous advancements in airframes, maintenance, and operations, over the past thirteen years, 
the AAF has been unable to conquer a plethora of challenges.  
One is a lack of a completion date. American commanders could not track progress for 
the air component because they never defined a timeline for what a fully functioning Afghan Air 
Force would look like and when it would be complete. As Anthony H. Cordesman, a security 
analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, noted, "There is no 
plan to create an Afghan Air Force as yet that could replace the role of the U.S. air component." 
AAF modernization efforts clearly suffer from an ambiguous timeline (Zucchino, 2019). 
Another vexing issue for the AAF is safety standards. In the 1990s, senior leadership 
within the AAF would periodically change tail numbers to keep hesitant pilots from not wanting 
to fly a possibly unsafe aircraft. Other questionable safety practices included using coke bottle 
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tops as replacement parts and not coordinating missions with Coalition forces (Marion, 2018, pp. 
42,60,82). 
Right now, the AAF transports troops, supplies, provides close air support, and evacuates 
casualties. Are they up to the standard that the United States and its allies expect of them? 
Airstrikes from the AAF have killed civilians at a disproportionately higher rate than American 
ones. The United Nations (U.N.) has noted that the AAF has been responsible for fifty-two 
percent of civilian casualties caused by airstrikes in the first half of 2018, even though the AAF 
conducts far fewer airstrikes than Coalition forces. Some Afghan pilots have been known to pull 
away from confirmed enemy targets for fear of hitting civilians. This puts into question if the 
AAF is even confident in its ability to conduct strike missions (Zucchino, 2019).  
Another challenge is the harsh terrain and weather of Afghanistan. Six times the size of 
Virginia, at 652,230 square kilometers, Afghanistan is a large country with vast airspace to 
cover. The landscape includes rugged mountains that can frequently experience earthquakes, 
flooding, and droughts. The topography limits the number of locations available to build a 
runway or even an entire base from which to launch operations (Afghanistan, 2021). As 
mentioned in the book Flight Risk, only two months of the year are considered suitable for flying 
due to weather. Outside of October and November, excessive heat, winds, and snow impede 
flight conditions (Marion, 2018, pp. 15). 
Poor safety standards, harsh terrain, and challenging weather are not the AAF's only 
problems. The AAF has struggled to find and keep qualified candidates to serve in its ranks. In 
2004, three years after the start of the war, there were no trained Afghan airmen. The last time an 
Afghan pilot completed formal flight training was in the early 1990s. When the U.S. mission to 
modernize the Afghan Air Force began, many Afghan senior military officials (mostly army 
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generals) sent their best recruits to the army. In 2011 nearly half of AAF personnel (roughly 
2,5000) were untrained, with many illiterates (Marion, 2018, pp. 149). In a grand 
understatement, Afghan military spokesman Brig. Gen Wilson D. Shoffner said, "We're starting 
a little late with the Air Force" (Jaffe, 2016). When training did begin, many of the Afghan pilots 
used their newfound English and aviation skills to work for high-paying private contractors 
(Marion, 2018, pp. 45,57,64). 
The AAF still falls short in its primary mission—fighting insurgents on its own 
(Zucchino, 2019). In March, I interviewed Ronald Neumann, Ambassador to Afghanistan, from 
July 2005 to April 2007. Ambassador Neumann explored one of the reasons for the difficulty of 
this mission. "We (the U.S.) tend to build foreign forces in our image, often more complex than 
they are ready for" (R.E. Neumann, personal communication, March 17, 2021). This quote is 
perfectly exemplified in the 2017 SIGAR report which concluded:  
"Providing advanced Western weapon and management systems to a largely 
illiterate and uneducated force without appropriate training and institutional 
infrastructure created long-term dependencies, required U.S. fiscal support, and 
extended sustainability timelines." (SIGAR, 2017). 
Path Dependency 
After fully evaluating the current state of the AAF, it might be prudent to question why 
the United States has continued to support them for so long. One explanation is that the United 
States has been entrenched in path dependency. According to Caroline Banton of Investopedia, 
path dependency is a theory that explains why a government or entity may continue to use a 
practice or product based on a historical preference or use (Banton, 2021). When the United 
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States and the Coalition decided in 2005 that they would build up the AAF, they were setting 
themselves up for a significant investment with a long timeline. Once this policy was in place, it 
became borderline impossible to change. A positive feedback loop developed, where a vast and 
complicated network of politicians, military personnel, and contractors, all became vested in this 
mission to modernize the AAF. One of the reasons this path has not been abandoned, even after 
all the setbacks, is the cost of exiting this current course of action. If Afghanistan has no suitable 
air force, then the United States and other Coalition members would have to pick up the slack 
and conduct all missions that require an air component. Another hurdle to clear in changing 
course is collective action. One politician alone (whether they be American or Afghan) cannot 
determine the fate of this mission. The same principle applies to military leaders. 
There is a tangible fear that the Taliban will march back into Kabul, regain power, and 
return Afghanistan to the civil war and repression of the nineties. The U.S. and its allies have 
helped usher in tremendous advancements in Afghan civil society, human rights, and freedoms 
for Afghan women (Why Afghan Women Fear a Peace Deal with the Taliban | The Dispatch, 
2019). To prevent the loss of all they have worked for, the U.S. Government continues to send 
troops, supplies, and intelligence to Afghanistan to help the Afghan government maintain the 
upper hand and force the Taliban to negotiate a settlement that will protect these advancements. 
The U.S. does not want this two-decades-long conflict to end in defeat, even as it prepares to exit 
the country. As President Trump stated in 2017,  
"Our nation must seek an honorable and enduring outcome worthy of the 
tremendous sacrifices that have been made, especially the sacrifices of lives. The 
men and women who serve our nation in combat deserve a plan for victory" 
(Hunter, 2017). 
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 The problem is, what is the U.S. definition of victory, and is it truly achievable after all 
this time? What does victory look like in terms of rebuilding the Afghanistan Air Force into a 
credible, self-sustaining defense force? To answer these questions, we need to examine how the 
United States has built up another partner nation's air force, the problems it encountered, and the 
aftermath. 
Country Comparison 
In multiple conflicts, the United States has used its vast array of resources and technology 
to extend strategic and financial support to a fledgling, or completely nonexistent, air force. One 
notable example is Iraq. In the following pages, I will address how the United States supported 
the Iraqi Air Force, the costs and benefits associated with these efforts, and the two-decades-long 
outcome from this endeavor. The outcomes for these two missions (Afghanistan and Iraq) are 
very different—one air force still struggles, and the other is on a slow rise back to regional 
prominence. In this comparison, I will shed light on how many factors come into play when 
supporting another country's air force, what policies were implemented, and how different the 
results can be. 
Iraq 
Founded in 1931, the Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) has served in numerous conflicts such as 
World War II, the Six-Day War, War of Attrition, Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War, and the Iraq War. 
Throughout the IQAF's history, many nations sold aircraft to Iraq and helped train their forces. 
The IQAF had broad experience flying various British, Soviet, and French aircraft. The numbers 
and success they achieved were brought to a halt after the U.S. invasion in 2003. 
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Today the IQAF is still in the process of rebuilding and reaching pre-invasion numbers. 
Although they are in a similar position as the AAF (rebuilding while fighting off an insurgency), 
the IQAF has seen more success in its recovery. This is due to a few notable differences between 
the forces and the countries themselves. It is these differences that are important to keep in mind 
when comparing the two situations. The first difference is the history of the services. In its 
prime, the IQAF had 1,029 aircraft, with 550 of those being combat aircraft. Although they were 
considered weak by Western standards, they were also considered the "most competent in the 
Arab world" (Jehl, 1990). The most aircraft the AAF ever possessed was a little over 400, and 
although at one point they were one of the largest air forces in the region, they were never highly 
regarded as a superior force (Hodge, 2012). Additionally, the IQAF has had more battle 
experience, especially during their prolonged conflict with Iran (1980-1988). Although size and 
combat experience are important, the Iraqis also benefited from certain cultural characteristics.  
As described in Flight Risk, Iraq possessed high literacy rates, a single language 
predominantly used throughout the country, a middle class, and a national identity (Marion, 
2018, pp. 119). These factors helped the IQAF recruit and train higher-quality military 
personnel. From the U.S. perspective, Iraq's geostrategic importance, and their oil industry, made 
having a capable IQAF vital and thus was prioritized from the start of the U.S. mission (Marion, 
2018, pp. 45). Rebuilding the AAF was not seen as a priority early in the war in Afghanistan. If 
it had been, maybe the AAF would be further along.  
Costs 
For fourteen years, the United States and its allies have fought long and hard to 
strengthen the AAF and make it an air force the Afghan people can be proud of and rely upon in 
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their time of need. This collective effort has seen mixed results, with the number of aircraft 
increasing, but combat effectiveness still in question. In this section, I will evaluate all the costs 
associated with this endeavor. In addition to the obvious financial statistics, I will examine other 
costs, some tangible, and others, less so—loss of life, public opinion, and the challenges of 
maintaining the training and support infrastructure, as well as the impact of the overall strategic 
mission of the War in Afghanistan that affects the AAF mission. 
Financial Investment 
War is not cheap. Last year alone, the United States spent $693.058 billion on defense 
(Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, 2019). For Fiscal Year 2020, the budget for the 
Department of Defense is approximately $721.5 billion (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, 
2020). The United States spends more on defense than the next ten countries combined. This list 
includes China, India, Russia, the U.K., and Japan (U.S. Defense Spending Compared to Other 
Countries, 2020). Although some would argue that high defense spending prevents war, many of 
these costs are attributed to maintaining and perpetuating existing conflicts such as the one in 
Afghanistan.  
Although the efforts to rebuild and modernize the Afghan Air Force may seem like a 
drop in the bucket compared to the overall defense budget, they add up quickly and illustrate the 
high cost of propping up foreign militaries to maintain U.S. strategic interests. To modernize the 
fleet of aircraft the AAF operates, the United States is adding one hundred and fifty-nine UH-60 
Black Hawk helicopters over a six-year period from 2017-2023. The cost for acquiring these 
helicopters, training the personnel, and sustaining them is estimated to be between $5.75 billion 
and $7 billion. This is a considerable investment given that up to 2019, the total spent on the 
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AAF overall was $8 billion (Zucchino, 2019). Brought in to replace the Russian-made MI-17 
helicopters, it will take time before the UH-60s are a fully integrated part of the AAF (SIGAR, 
2019).  
Another expensive program is the $549 million investment the United States made in 
Italian cargo planes for the AAF. Bought in 2008, the twenty G222 aircraft were unreliable, 
spare parts were hard to procure, there were maintenance issues and safety concerns that 
involved several near-fatal mishaps. Six years after their acquisition, the program was shut down, 
and the planes sold for scrap metal. After investing $549 million into the G222 airframes, the 
United States got back a mere $40,257 total (Luce, 2021). A thirty-seven-page SIGAR report 
published in February 2021, documented the problems in the acquisition process. Amazingly, no 
one was held accountable for this expensive program failure (SIGAR, 2021). 
Financial investment does not only apply to manned systems. In 2015, the Pentagon spent 
$174 million on a drone program that would have helped the AAF and ANA conduct 
surveillance on their own. Equipping the smaller ScanEagle drone, this program suffered from a 
lack of accountability from Afghan forces, not knowing how to care for the equipment properly, 
and an inability to use the intelligence gathered by the drones (Gibbons-Neff, 2020). 
Casualties 
The most obvious non-financial cost in a wartime scenario is the human cost. Casualties 
often attract the most media attention worldwide and can be the number one reason to withdraw 
from a mission. The numbers are unclear on the exact number of military deaths in support of 
modernizing the AAF, but it has not been without human loss. Organizations such as the 
Brookings Institute track American, Coalition, and Afghan fatalities, however, AAF fatalities are 
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grouped with the Afghan National Army (ANA) (Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of 
Reconstruction and Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan, 2020).  
Many AAF casualties result from helicopter crashes. As recently as March 18, 2021, an 
AAF Mi-17 crashed, killing the pilot, three crew members, five special forces soldiers—all 
Afghans (Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), 2021). This incident comes after an AAF Mi-17 crash 
in 2019, that killed seven Afghan military personnel (Afp, 2019). In 2018, an Afghan helicopter 
crashed killing all twenty-five onboard, including a top Afghan commander. Incidents like these 
often put into question whether these helicopters are shot down by the Taliban or suffer from 
devastating technical issues. The uncertainties surrounding these crashes add to a long series of 
tragedies for the AAF (Staff, 2018).   
Public Opinion 
Public opinion drives policy and can ultimately affect the U.S. mission. Although there 
are no polls on the U.S. mission to modernize the AAF, there are a few regarding the war itself. 
According to the Pew Research Center, as recently as 2018, "almost half of all American adults 
(49%) say the United States has failed in achieving its goals" in Afghanistan (Oliphant, 2018). 
For many wars, public opinion has played a crucial role in the scope and duration of the conflict. 
A combination of geographical distance, the small percentage of the American population with 
military ties, declining casualty rates, and the long duration of the war have all contributed to a 
lack of interest and attention by the American citizenry to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. War 
fatigue and diminished support will most certainly lead to U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
the untimely end of the mission to modernize the AAF. As Ambassador Neumann said in our 
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interview, "If you don't have a lot of casualties, people lose interest" (R.E. Neumann, personal 
communication, March 17, 2021).  
Political relevance is another consideration. The war in Afghanistan no longer receives 
the media coverage it did in the 2000s or even the mid-2010s. During the 2020 presidential 
election, the war was rarely mentioned. Presidential candidate Tulsi Gabbard said one of her top 
priorities was to end "wasteful wars." This comment did not even focus on Afghanistan but 
rather on military action in Syria and Iraq (Richard Lardner, The Associated Press & Price, 
2019). Ambassador Neumann touched on this phenomenon by stating that "Afghanistan is not 
deciding how people vote in elections now." Its importance has diminished not only in the public 
eye but in the minds of Congress as well. Ambassador Neumann added that there was "no 
pressure in Congress" for the war. This diminishing interest in Afghanistan could be a blessing 
or a curse for the AAF. With less public pressure and awareness, it could be better for missions 
that require a significant amount of time to see to the end. At the same time, this lack of 
awareness can be seen as a detriment, as fewer people will advocate for continuing such a long 
and expensive mission. 
Training 
The United States has a proud history of partnering with allied nations to strengthen each 
other's armed forces, including their air forces. Although this strategy has worked well for other 
nations, the U.S. relationship with the AAF has been tenuous at best. In 2011, a twenty-year 
AAF officer shot and killed eight American military personnel and one civilian contractor. 
Similar incidents have plagued the American and coalition armies when dealing with the Afghan 
Security and Police Forces (Raddatz, 2011). In 2019, a program designed to let Afghan pilots 
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train on the AC-208 platform was discreetly terminated after more than forty percent of the pilots 
disappeared during training. Another similar program for the A-29 platform is being moved back 
to Afghanistan instead of its previous location at Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, Georgia. 
This program also experienced desertions, but the report claims the reason for moving the 
program was enough Afghan pilots had learned how to fly the aircraft (Dickstein, 2019). 
Training issues have not affected only the Afghan programs. In 2019, a Saudi flight student, 
Royal Air Force Lieutenant Alshamrani, killed three American servicemen and injured eight 
others in a terrorist attack at Naval Air Station Pensacola.  
Incidents like these highlight the numerous challenges in training Afghans. In January 
2020, I interviewed Captain David Diorio, Ph.D., USN, retired, by email. In my conversation 
with Captain Diorio, he mentioned that many Afghans do not speak English, so the applicant 
pool is already very narrow. Additionally, those who speak English are usually well off and may 
not be as enthusiastic about undertaking grueling flight training. Americans must also be 
cognizant of not spending time and money training the enemy. The murders of American 
military and civilian personnel by the people they were training highlight the dangers of 
modernizing foreign militaries where culture and ideological differences may create enemies 
hiding in plain sight. Determining who is loyal to the program can be a lengthy and expensive 
process.  
Another training challenge is actual time in the cockpit. Because getting actual flight 
hours can be expensive and lead to a myriad of maintenance issues, most American pilots spend 
countless hours in trainers. Although NATO operates some helicopter trainers out of Shindand 
Air Base, Herat Province, to allow Afghan pilots to train and gain proficiency in their respective 
aircraft, the Afghans will need to develop a comprehensive training complex of their own. (D.R. 
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DiOrio, personal communication, January 26, 2021). The sharing of knowledge also is an issue 
within the Afghan ranks. Due to a lack of a retirement system for Afghan military members, 
older Afghan pilots and maintainers often were less willing to share information that could help 
their younger counterparts. (Marion, 2018, pp. 57).  
Contractors 
It is hard to pick out any winners in this brutal and seemingly never-ending conflict. Who 
benefits from the U.S. government pouring billions of dollars into Afghan's fledgling air force? 
The obvious answer is the Afghan people. If the AAF can carry out every mission set and 
conduct all maintenance on their aircraft without American and Coalition assistance, then the 
mission will have been a success. The Afghan people will have an air force that they can be 
proud of and one that can effectively defend their nation from the Taliban and other insurgents. 
However, another less obvious winner is the military contractor, who wins whether the war 
reaches a conclusion or not. The contractor is a unique entity in the realm of modern warfare—a 
business entity that does not represent any nation. The contractor can offer its services for 
security, maintenance, intelligence, construction, and more. Often coming at a price cheaper than 
that of the government equivalent, many contractors are agile, can take risks the American forces 
cannot and can be seen as a cost-saving measure. 
For many governments around the world, contractors play an integral role in supporting 
military missions. Even the U.S. military relies heavily on contractors and private military 
companies or "PMCs." In March 2021, I interviewed Colonel Tobias Switzer, U.S. Air Force 
combat aviation advisor, foreign area officer, and Olmsted Scholar. During our conversation, 
Colonel Switzer said that around ninety percent of the effort to modernize the AAF is done by 
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contractors and that almost every modern air force relies heavily on them. This includes security, 
maintenance, language training, and more (T.B. Switzer personal communication, March 10, 
2021). In his article for the Modern War Institute, Colonel Switzer explains how contractors can 
be, and often are, extremely useful. Not only do their services come at a lower cost, but they are 
lower profile than your average U.S. service member in a uniform (Switzer, 2021). When a 
service member dies overseas, it can draw heavy media coverage and scrutiny. This same 
attention generally does not apply to contractors and thus politically, makes their use more 
beneficial to the United States. 
Ultimately, these contractors exist to make money. In our interview, Colonel Switzer 
touched on how seemingly never-ending missions such as the one in Afghanistan are like a "pot 
of gold" for these companies. The contracts are quite lucrative—maintenance for the UH-60s 
from 2019-2023 is estimated to be around $2.8 billion. The importance of contractors is not 
going away anytime soon. According to the 2019 SIGAR report, "it is likely that the AAF and 
SMW (Special Mission Wing) will continue to rely on contracted maintenance to support the 
UH-60 beyond 2023." While the individuals on the ground want to see progress in their mission, 
from a business standpoint, the military contractors benefit financially from the war continuing 
for as long as possible. 
Benefits 
Throughout the ongoing process to strengthen and modernize the AAF, there have 
varying levels of success. This success can be measured in numerous ways, some more impactful 
than others. Producing a crop of newly minted, English-speaking, ready-to-fly Afghan aviators is 
more crucial to the U.S. mission than one Afghan pilot being able to moderately fly their aircraft 
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without crashing. I will present the two critical benefits that the U.S. strategy has produced and 
how each one relates to the overall mission. Although these purported benefits seem great on 
paper, they have yet to fully materialize into measurable results. 
Regional Security 
When the war in Afghanistan began, the U.S. goal was to punish those responsible for the 
attacks on September 11 and destroy their safe haven in Afghanistan by defeating the Taliban. 
The United States was clinical in its fight. In just two short months, the Taliban had been driven 
out of their positions in Herat, Kabul, Jalalabad, and finally Kandahar (Laub, 2017). Often 
overlooked in this opening attack is the crucial role airpower played. U.S. aircraft targeted Al-
Qaeda and Taliban positions repeatedly before any ground troops arrived. In 2021, the goal now 
is to stabilize the region and bring peace to Afghanistan by preventing the Taliban's return to 
power and their attempts to reverse the progress made in the region over the last twenty years. 
Afghan civil society has flourished under U.S. protection. There have been monumental changes 
in human rights, although there is still a long way to go. The strength and effectiveness of the 
AAF is just one piece of the puzzle; many factors play into this mission. But in the world of 
armed conflict, a strong air component is not only important but vital. 
Keeping the Afghan government intact and having an effective AAF will help with 
regional security. Throughout its history, Afghanistan has been host to various terrorist 
organizations. Additionally, Afghanistan shares a border with a known U.S. rival, Iran. A strong 
Afghan Air Force would give the United States another asset to deal with these strategic threats. 
A modern air force would bolster the Afghan Security and Police Forces, making the Afghan 
military stronger. With a strong, stable ally in the region, the United States would feel more 
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comfortable in strategic competitions against non-state actors and nations, and the AAF could 
fulfill its mission of protecting Afghanistan from both foreign and domestic threats with 
professional, self-sustaining airpower.  
Less Strain on U.S. Military 
 Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has been heavily entrenched in sectarian 
conflicts throughout the Middle East and Asia. They have been doing this while also countering 
the rising threat posed by China and Russia. Many would argue that these varying interests are 
spreading the military too thin. The War in Afghanistan has involved a considerable amount of 
U.S. military resources. The U.S. has invested heavily in the Afghan military so it could 
eventually provide their security and no longer require U.S. and coalition support. Afghan self-
sufficiency is listed in the SIGAR report as a key objective for the UH-60 modernization 
program (SIGAR, 2019). But despite the U.S.'s best efforts, there is evidence this has not been 
entirely successful. 
A strong, well-equipped, self-sufficient, and most importantly, combat-effective AAF 
would make U.S. support unnecessary. As mentioned previously in this paper, the AAF is not 
any of these things, nor will it be anytime soon. 
Alternatives 
If the current strategy is not working, what else could the United States be doing? When 
evaluating these alternatives, it is important to consider multiple factors at play, such as 
feasibility, cost, timeframe, and more. 
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Maintain the Status Quo 
An easy and often the first alternative to point out for any cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is 
"what if the company, country, etc.… changed nothing at all?" This scenario would involve the 
United States continuing its present course with no changes. We now know that by September 
11, 2021, the Biden Administration is planning on having all U.S. forces out of Afghanistan 
(Sabbagh & Borger, 2021). NATO forces also plan on leaving by that date. Many analysts and 
journalists have already come out against this decision. However, if the United States continued 
its present course, how much longer would it take to complete a mission that has already 
experienced numerous failures and taken a great deal longer than previously anticipated? 
According to the SIGAR report on the UH-60 modernization program, U.S. financial 
commitments for this program alone run through 2023 (SIGAR, 2019). Staying for another five, 
ten, fifteen years would add immeasurable costs to this mission. Given the existing sunk costs 
and failures highlighted in this paper, doing nothing could be seen as a deeply flawed strategy 
where the United States is subject to path dependency.  
Withdrawal of all U.S. Troops 
Another alternative would be to withdraw all U.S. troops. From a cost-benefit 
perspective, this solution would generate the most savings in time, money, and resources. For 
years, this alternative is one that many have wanted, but most administrations had been hesitant 
to execute. 
At the time of this writing, the Biden Administration is pursuing this alternative (April 
2021). In his first press conference, the newly elected President said, "We are not staying for a 
long time… We will leave. The question is when we will leave" (Liebermann, 2021). This was 
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followed up by a promise to withdraw all forces by September 11, 2021. This withdrawal will be 
analyzed for years to come on how it will affect U.S. foreign policy moving forward, the future 
of Afghanistan, and more.  
But how will U.S. withdrawal affect the AAF? It is not completely out of the question 
that the AAF will crumble with the state that supports them. As I have mentioned earlier, the 
mission's success is inextricably linked to the overall war. In December of 2018, Marine Lt. Gen. 
Kenneth McKenzie Jr. told Congress, "If we left precipitously right now, I do not believe they 
would be able to successfully defend their country." Additionally, Anthony H. Cordesman said 
that "The Afghan Air Force, while it is improving, has not in any sense offset the need for more 
and more U.S. air presence." If U.S. airpower is still needed, and the Afghan forces are unable to 
defend their country, then complete and total withdrawal could lead to an ineffective and 
incomplete AAF attempting to fend off the Taliban and various other terrorist organizations 
(Zucchino, 2019). In terms of the current plans to withdraw, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin 
recently said. "We will look to continue funding key capabilities, such as the Afghan Air Force." 
The United States has not forgotten the AAF in its plans to withdraw, but only time will tell if 
funding is enough to save Afghanistan's air force (Bowman, 2021). 
Increased Coalition Support 
It is important to note that throughout this conflict, the United States has had the support 
of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), commonly referred to as "The 
Coalition." Although the U.S. has had the strongest hand in strategy and has made the most 
sizable investments, they have rarely acted alone. Another alternative would be to request more 
support from fellow Coalition members. In 2017, President Trump made headlines across the 
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U.S. when he said that "NATO members must finally contribute their fair share and meet their 
financial obligations'' (Baker, 2017). This comment was not targeted at the effort in Afghanistan 
specifically, but it can be applied there. All NATO members are leaving with U.S. forces by 
September 11, 2021, but what if they not only stayed but increased their support through 
additional money or personnel, both of which the AAF needs. It has been shown in past conflicts 
that NATO support can be quite useful, but how much more would be necessary to push the 
mission past the finish line? That answer is unknown and increased NATO support is unlikely if 
the U.S. withdraws.  
Follow the Soviets 
What lessons could the U.S. learn from the Soviet's experience in Afghanistan? For much 
of their history, the Russians heavily supported the AAF. So much so that in the early 1900s, the 
British considered the AAF "to all intents and purposes a Russian service, and may, indeed be 
regarded as a Russian advanced base" (Marion, 2018, pp. 9). From 1979 to 1988, the USSR was 
even more hands-on with their support when they fought to keep the communist government in 
power. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan after almost ten years, they withdrew their 
support for the Afghan military, which was then unable to sustain itself at the same levels and 
fell into disarray as infighting resumed amongst the various Afghan factions. When looking for a 
comparison to the current conflict, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan provides many of the 
same lessons, with similar conclusions (assuming the September 11th pullout remains). 
Russia is interested in the ongoing situation in Afghanistan due to its geographic 
proximity and history with the country. Having learned a lesson from their protracted war, this 
other superpower and U.S. adversary is attempting to contrast the American "hard power" 
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strategy with "soft power." They are doing this by making several economic investments in the 
country to win back the favor of the people (Munoz, 2017). Is it possible that the United States 
could pull out and follow a similar course? President Joe Biden recently said that "We went for 
two reasons: get rid of Bin Laden and to end the safe haven. I never thought we were there to 
somehow unify… Afghanistan. It has never been done" (Sabbagh & Borger, 2021). These 
sentiments echo similar conclusions expressed by the Soviets in the late eighties. Mikhail 
Gorbachev decided that the deaths of 15,000 Soviet soldiers with another 35,000 wounded and 
billions of dollars spent were enough to conclude what many Westerners called "Russia's 
Vietnam" (History.com Editors, 2019). The United States accomplished its mission of ridding 
the world of Osama Bin Laden. While it is open for debate as to whether it has eliminated 
terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan, it has significantly weakened the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. If 
the U.S. discontinues its "hard power" strategy, what soft power initiatives will the U.S. continue 
to use to keep Afghanistan stable?  
Since the early days of the war, one soft power strategy that has been the most visible is 
the attempt to win the "hearts and minds" of the Afghan people while simultaneously destroying 
the enemy with military might. These efforts have seen varying levels of success with increased 
access to women's education and freedom of the press, but terrorist groups continue to recruit in 
large numbers. Suppose the United States wants to pull out but continues to influence Afghan 
society. In that case, they need to continue support for a free press, women's education, and 
institutions like the American University of Afghanistan in Kabul. Whether the United States 
continues to support or expand its soft power policies remains to be seen, but it could be an 




The United States was not wrong to attempt to build up and modernize the AAF to 
become a viable component of a secure and stable Afghanistan. Airpower is essential to winning 
wars, and the war in Afghanistan was no different. As reported by The Guardian, the reality on 
the ground, as stated by NATO members last month, is that "There is no military solution to the 
problems Afghanistan faces" (Sabbagh & Borger, 2021). This statement sums up the difficulty 
faced by the U.S. in its efforts to build the Afghan Air Force into a modern, self-sufficient 
combat force. Thirteen years after the U.S. initially tried to rebuild the AAF, there are still 
significant issues impacting this mission, as outlined in this paper. The financial costs are 
substantial and harder to justify to an increasingly disinterested American public. The training 
issues are complex and exacerbated by language and cultural differences between American and 
Afghan personnel. It is fair to say that most American people no longer care what happens in 
Afghanistan, especially what happens with the AAF.  
I believe that path dependency—the resistance to change because of history—is what 
preserved a mission that, for the most part, has been a failure. The U.S. has had thirteen years to 
accomplish its mission. It is time that the U.S. recognizes that this mission is no longer cost-
effective and that the best course of action would be to discontinue additional support for the 
AAF. Existing contracts, such as those for the UH-60s, should still be honored, but any other 
financial commitments should be placed elsewhere. Even though the departure of the 6,350 U.S. 
contractors currently operating in Afghanistan will have a devastating effect on the AAF, who 
rely heavily on them (Bowman, 2021), as well as on the profit margins of the contractors, this 
withdrawal ultimately will save the American taxpayer money in the long run from no longer 
having to pay to train AAF pilots, invest in new aircraft, develop AAF facilities, and more. 
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The new Afghan peace process likely includes a sharing of power between the Afghan 
government and the Taliban. Not only does this mean that Taliban members could have access to 
AAF resources, but they could join the organization as well. In effect, we will have built an 
organization our enemy now may be able to exploit. How will this sharing of power affect the 
AAF? The last time the Taliban had control of air assets, they were barely adequate. This time 
could be different, but I predict that if a heavily trained AAF still struggles with conducting 
missions and efficiently using their capabilities, then Taliban fighters with no training will not 
make it any better. 
A capable AAF would have been integral in preventing the Taliban resurgence from 
happening in the first place. However, after thirteen years of investment, the AAF has not 
demonstrated the ability to perform its mission. When one invests in stock, and they lose money, 
what should they do? Continue to invest billions of dollars over two decades in hopes of getting 
a good return? I would say no. The AAF, although it has seen limited progress, has been a 
failure. It will fail when the U.S. leaves, and that is something the U.S. needs to accept. 
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